INTRODUCTION
THE THEORY of external diseconomies asserts that the socially optimal price of a good causing a diseconomy should be above its marginal cost. We also know that a monopolist will charge a price above its marginal cost. The purpose of this paper is to determine the relationship between these two prices. In addition, we demonstrate that knowledge of consumer preferences permits one to infer whether the monopoly price would be higher or lower than the socially optimal price. This relationship is of both theoretical and applied interest.
Baumol and Oates [1] suggested some practical ways to measure the marginal harm to the environment in the presence of external diseconomies, using certain environmental standards. In general, the determination of the socially optimal price is impossible because the elements determining the price are unobserved. We will prove a theorem based on elasticity characteristics of the utility function, which yields policy information necessary to achieve a social optimum. We shall also prove that a large class of utility functions will yield the same optimal prices; in particular, the socially optimal price is equal to the monopoly price.
In the past, it has been commonly asserted that the monopolistic price would be higher than the socially optimal price in the presence of consumption diseconomies. This view is illustrated by Naor [8] , and in a more general case by Knudsen [7] . They do not deal with a general model of external diseconomies, but rather with a specific case of a queuing model with a waiting line. Within this context, including some restrictions on the utility function, they derive the above relationship between the monopolistic and the socially optimal prices. Buchanan [2] also discusses the possibility of having a socially optimal price higher than the monopolistic price. Examples of such possibilities in the context of diseconomies arising from congestion are supplied by Edelson [6] .2 Similar problems were discussed by Diamond and Mirrlees [5] in dealing with the relationship between the Pareto optimal situation and the competitive equilibrium. In addition, a general discussion of optimal surcharge in cases of consumption externalities is given in Diamond [4] . ' Research for this paper was done while I. Luski was Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Florida. We are indebted to Milton Z. Kafoglis and David Levhari for helpful comments and suggestions.This paper states general conditions upon the ronsumer's utility function which will enable us to predict the precise relationship between the socially optimal price and the monopoly price in the case of external diseconomies. Thus, the condition derived here narrows the range of uncertainty about the socially optimal price. We will assume that the externalities are in terms of aggregates; i.e., the marginal utility of an increased demand arising from someone else is independent of which other person is demanding. The second assumption is that consumers, when determining nct demand, ignore the effect upon themselves caused by thcir demand, which is equivalent to the effect caused by the net demand of others.
An example of a good for which these assumptions may be reasonable is automobile use, which gives rise to either congestion or smog. Thus, when Ui is the utility function of the ith consumer, Ui = Ui(Xi, W) where W enters only as a parameter. In particular, we assume W = W(IJ= 1 X). 3 
THE MODEL

Consumption
For simplicity we shall assume that there are n consumers, each consuming one commodity which gives rise to the external diseconomy. Let Xi be the amount consumed by consumer i. The level of the external diseconomy, W, is a function of the overall quantity of X consumed. Let p-be the solution to the above problem. Our major task is to investigate the relationship between the socially optimal price, p*, and the monopoly price, p.
THE GENERAL SOLUTION
The socially optimal price (p*) will be higher than the monopoly price (fi) if MR(p*) < 0. From the second order condition of the monopoly maximization we know that dMR(p)/dp < 0; thus, for MR(-) = 0, p* must be higher than -. 4 Therefore, the question of the relationship of p to p* depends on the sign of MR(p*). We will first demonstrate a relationship between marginal revenue and marginal utility (with respect to the price p). This lemma asserts that the case of p* > -is the uncommon one, since we usually expect aqi/ap < 0.
For the remainder of our discussion we will assume that there are identical consumers and therefore we can consider a representative one. Thus, the above equations become: ax ( 
